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There is a distinction to be made between the term 'mass hysteria' and 'hysteria'
What is the difference besides the former involves more than one person?
There is a distinction to be made between the term 'mass hysteria' and 'hysteria'
I know. But if you look back at the history and case histories the presentation of hysteria is mentioned as 'florid' - the women are manic and attention seeking they have spasms and dance around etc. ME/CFS has never been spoken of in this way - writings on neurasthenia, on the other hand talk of prostration and malaise etc which is more like ME/CFS.
I do not in any way believe there is any proof for psychogenesis in relation to any of this. What I do wonder is if some of the people who were given these diagnosis in the 18th and 19th century did in fact have what we now call ME/CFS.
I also agree with you on the gender roles assigned in these cases - it was, in part, the topic of my MA dissertation.
As someone who studied this stuff for my degree and MA in philosophy I do understand the mind/body stuff and that it is all 'bodily/organic' etc - you misundertood what I was saying. Which is that there were always people with the illness now called ME/CFS or CFIDS or SEID or whatever who were put in the hysteria/neuresthenia bag. There is no reason to think it suddenly started in the documented outbreak of 1934.
And what did Freud do after his "peers" rejected his original observation that men of his day were sexually abusing their children, grandchildren, friend's children, nieces? He went back and changed his "research" conclusions to say these females were fantasizing this sexual abuse. Failure of moral courage INDEED!Breaking Away from the Cult
This is an interesting review by a psychologist of Jeffrey Masson's book
FINAL ANALYSIS
The Making and Unmaking of a Psychoanalyst
http://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/21/books/breaking-away-from-the-cult.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm
"Mr. Masson is not just any man who became disenchanted with his profession or his religion (in this case, the same thing). He is the man who, through friendship with Anna Freud and her close associate Kurt Eissler, became in 1980 the projects director of the Sigmund Freud Archives, the sanctum sanctorum of the psychoanalytic establishment, the source of documents that had been sealed to the outside world until the next century. And he is the man who used many of these newly discovered materials to argue, in ''The Assault on Truth,'' that Freud was guilty of ''a failure of moral courage'' when he denied the reality of the childhood sexual abuse his patients reported, deciding instead that they were fantasizing. Psychoanalysts did not respond to this news by saying, ''Oh, thank you, Jeff, for explaining why the entire foundation of psychoanalysis is wrong!'' They unceremoniously kicked him out. He had become, and to many still remains, ''the arch traitor, the Antichrist in the church of psychoanalysis,'' as Mr. Masson describes himself."
Many psychologists probably are embarrassed by this sort of garbage, but Shorter isn't a psychologist, a psychiatrist or a medical doctor of any kind. He's a historian, at least in name, if not in fact. (I recall that during the process of coming up with the new DSM, about half of those in involved did not want the MUS -- medically unexplained symptoms -- definition in there as a mental illness.)If I was a psychologist I would be embarrassed to be associated with these people.
Why not include science fiction, too, since that's basically what Shorter writes. Re: Showalter, there have always been the "Uncle Toms" amongst oppressed people. They like to give the impression that, yes, they are aware their class of persons is inferior, but they themselves are somehow so much better than those peons, in this case "hysterical women" and should therefore be given special privileges not given to those inferiors.How is this in PubMed? Why not have literary criticism articles too if you're going to include this bullshit?
And let's not forget that we still live in a male-supremist/male-dominant world where the misogyny is culturally accepted, many times quite unconsciously. The men who own, run and profit by the media, the research cultures, the governments, the churches -- they all love it when a female assassinates her own kind..
@Bob - I posted the material about Elaine Showalter (which I hope you have read) because she and Shorter cross reference each other and reinforce each others theories and publications. They have both been highly influential in portraying ME as not only psychosomatic, but have put it into a supposed historical continuum of 'hysterical diseases', or 'hysterical plagues' as Showalter puts it.
And ridiculous as they sound, it is not the case that no one takes them seriously. Showalter got massive and sustained publicity for the preposterous theories from her book 'Hystories'.
Members of the British intelligentsia went public in the media and net to agree with Showalter and to disparage ME patients in terrible ways. They sounded beside themselves with contempt for ME sufferers.
The words "Elaine Showalter says ..... " were everywhere. Then she played the victim, portrayed the patients as nasty and threatening, herself as "brave", and played the media to her own advantage yet again, and got even more publicity, and more sympathy.
Does that sound familiar?
Do you detect a copycat recurrence of Showalter's tactics in 2011/12 .....
.
PhD Shorter should be challenged to read Osler's Web by Hillary Johnson. Now that's history!
(I recall that during the process of coming up with the new DSM, about half of those in involved did not want the MUS -- medically unexplained symptoms -- definition in there as a mental illness.)
Ronald Pies on Psychiatric Times
http://www.psychiatrictimes.com/cognitive-disorders/what-is-disease?
What Is “Disease”?
Implications of Chronic Fatigue Syndrome
News | February 24, 2015 | Cognitive Disorders, History of Psychiatry
By Ronald W. Pies, MD
A two page commentary
What do physicians intend by the term “disease”? This may strike many clinicians as a philosophical question more suited to medieval scholastics than to practicing physicians. But the recent 235-page report on “systemic exertion intolerance disease” (SEID) from the Institute of Medicine1 (IOM) casts this question in a new light and has many practical implications for patients, physicians, and third-party payers.
The definition of “disease” has been a matter of contention since the dawn of clinical medicine. For example, the ancient Greek academies of Knidos and Kos had differing views of disease.2 Knidos, the school of Aesculapius, recognized the discrete morbid entity—such as an abscess or tumor—as the defining feature of disease, subservient to the general rules of pathology. The more empirical school of Kos, associated with Hippocrates, emphasized the sick individual with his particular kind of misery. In effect, these two schools saw disease either as a specific pathological processor as a particular human experience whose character was determined by the patient’s manner of presentation.
In the 19th century, medical science was revolutionized by the German pathologist Rudolf Virchow and his famous pronouncement: Es gibt keine Allgemein krankheiten, es gibt nur Local krankheiten—“There is no general, only local, disease.” But Ludwig Aschoff, Virchow’s colleague, argued that Virchow wished merely to localize lesions,not diseases.3 There are indeed reasons to believe that Virchow conceptualized disease as a generalized condition of the living organism, which, unlike lesions, disappears when the organism dies.
To this day, the definition of disease remains controversial. Recently, in its deliberations on obesity, the AMA requested an advisory opinion from its Council on Science and Public Health. The question before the Council was, “Is obesity a disease?” The Council’s considered response was a lesson in both the limits of language and the merits of humility: “Without a single, clear, authoritative, and widely accepted definition of disease, it is difficult to determine conclusively whether or not obesity is a medical disease state.”4
Unfortunately, in the past 50 years, narrow interpretations of Virchow, such as those of the late psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, have dominated discussions of what constitutes “disease.”5 This has led to the claim—mistaken, in my view—that only those conditions with specific and identifiable pathophysiology or anatomical abnormalities “count” as disease.
Yet these criteria fly in the face of medical diagnosis throughout the ages and are not consistent with several modern-day diagnoses in the fields of neurology, psychiatry, and pain medicine. Physicians in these fields recognize that many states of severe suffering and incapacity cannot yet be causally linked with specific biochemical or anatomical findings.5 For example, migraine headache, trigeminal neuralgia, and even epilepsy remain clinical diagnoses—made primarily on the basis of the patient’s history and subjective reports. (Physical examination and imaging studies, of course, are important in ruling out certain lesions, such as a brain tumor.)
This is also true for the vast majority of psychiatric disorders. It is the patient’s degree of suffering and incapacity—or distress and dysfunction—that defines a state of disease (etymologically, dis-ease). Of course, pathophysiologic correlates, imaging studies, and biomarkers can help us understand the underlying biological nature of the specific disease process and devise appropriate treatments. But such abnormalities are neither necessary nor sufficient for the recognition of “disease” as a profound and troubling human experience.5
Indeed, in the edition of Harrison’s Principles of Internal Medicine that I used when I was a resident, the following breathtakingly broad definition of disease was put forth:
The clinical method has as its object the collection of accurate data concerning all the diseases to which human beings are subject; namely, all conditions that limit life in its powers, enjoyment, and duration [italics added].6
The editors went on to say that the physician’s “. . . primary and traditional objectives are utilitarian—the prevention and cure of disease and the relief of suffering, whether of body or of mind . . . [italics added].”6
Now comes the IOM report, which has renamed so-called chronic fatigue syndrome (also called “myalgic encephalomyelitis”) as “systemic exertion intolerance disease” (SEID) and proposed essentially clinical criteria for its diagnosis. (Our word “clinical” is derived from the Greek klinikē “bedside”—so, diagnosis made at the bedside). In brief, the SEID criteria entail the following:
• Substantial reduction or impairment in the ability to engage in pre-illness levels of occupational, educational, social, or personal activities
• Postexertional malaise
• Unrefreshing sleep
• Either cognitive impairment or orthostatic intolerance (or both)
Note that the SEID criteria do not require the identification of any specific biological, biochemical, or neuroanatomical abnormality. Rather, they entail a substantial degree of distress and impairment. To be clear: the report did find evidence of a strong association of SEID with diminished natural killer cell function; Epstein-Barr virus infection; decreased cardiopulmonary function; and neuropsychiatric testing abnormalities—but these correlates are not required for diagnosis of SEID.1 Similar biomarkers and associated abnormalities have been found in several psychiatric disorders. For example, abnormal eye movements can distinguish persons with schizophrenia from normal persons with considerable accuracy.7 Nevertheless, current diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia remain clinical, as with SEID.
Already, the IOM report has attracted sharp criticism, with some physicians questioning the lack of specificity in the SEID criteria and worrying about the potential for overdiagnosis and even outright fraud. These risks are not trivial, but I would argue that as physicians, our first duty is the recognition and relief of human suffering and incapacity, whether or not we can identify the specific pathophysiology underlying the patient’s condition. With respect to SEID, the IOM report makes it abundantly clear that this condition can have profoundly adverse effects on the sufferer’s social and vocational function.1
To be sure, we must continue to investigate the biological underpinnings of SEID, just as we must in disease states such as schizophrenia and atypical facial pain. When our patients are suffering and incapacitated owing to some internal process, however, we have both clinical and ethical reasons to recognize that disease is present, and to do our utmost to treat it.
With the exception of the Sunday Times Michael Hanlon feature (May 2013),