Yes, so is it? Here she says, "Some people say that because we haven’t worked out the biology, the illness must be psychological. This is an extraordinary conclusion: there are plenty of illnesses we don’t understand, but that doesn’t mean we dismiss them as psychological." I don't know the history of Esther Crawley's comments, but it definitely contradicts Simon Wessely's famous "ME is the belief that you have a disease called ME", which precisely dismisses ME as psychological.
Come to think of it, I'm also surprised to see her use the phrase "dismiss as psychological" -- that seems to not be singing off the same hymn sheet as the "oh so you think psychological illnesses aren't real" objection, or at the very least is curiously orthogonal to it.
So, taking this editorial at face value (which I know is highly problematic given the history of the other side maintaining that we are delusional, but bear with me) it does seem to me to be a shift from what I would have expected. I would have expected "there is no boundary between psychological and physical" (whatever that means to them, I'm still not sure it's more than just a way to call people "dualists" by way of insult) and an assertion that the disease is psychosocial-genic. But instead we get here an affirmation that it is physical and a denial that it is psychological. There thus does seem to be some daylight between the standard BPS party line and this editorial.
Which is interesting. I like this rhetoric better. I'd like it a lot more if we could be sure that it did not correspond to the same sort of "illness belief" treatment as the old rhetoric, a submerging of an unacceptable way of speaking (it's not nice to call patients delusional) while pursuing business as usual for the treatment.
Call me crazy (ok, I'm crazy
but I'm still willing to hope that there are some BPS people somewhere who are not lost causes, who might actually come around. Though to be fair, it's pretty hard to walk back a claim that patients are delusional.