alex3619
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I started this post in the IOM section. I consider this paper very relevant to the IOM debate.
Brurberg et al. said:Reitsmaet al26 suggest clinical test validation as an alternative paradigm for evaluation of a diagnostic test when an acceptable reference standard is missing. Hence, primary studies and systematic reviews on prognosis and therapy are alternative sources to evaluate the usefulness of different case definitions of CFS/ME. We have identified only one such publication, the PACE trial.60Here, participants were diagnosed according to the Oxford-1991 criteria, Empirical criteria-2007/Reeves and London ME-1994/National Task Force criteria, and then randomised to either standard medical treatment, graded exercise therapy, cognitive behaviour therapy or pacing. The results showed that the effectiveness of the treatments was similar across groups, irrespective of the case definition which had been used. Fluge et al9 applied the CDC-1994/Fukuda and retrospectively added the Canada criteria in their study on the effects of rituximab in CFS with comparable results. In a recent publication, Maes et al21 measured symptom severity, selected biomarkers and postexertional malaise in 144 patients with CF, of whom 107 fulfilled the CDC-1994/Fukuda criteria of CFS/ME. They claimed that CF, CFS and ME are distinct categories, although stating that patients group together in one continuum with no clear boundaries between them.21 Such studies would be even more useful if outcomes of specific treatment modes had also been tested.
Brurberg et al. said:An argument for more inclusive case definitions for CFS/ME would be the issue of treatment, since existing evidence indicates that side effects of cognitive behavioural treatment or graded exercise therapy are negligible. For this context, the CDC-1994/Fukuda case definition appears suitable, with the NICE-2007 as a good candidate for validation studies.
Brurberg et al. said:Proponents of recent case definitions, such as Canada-2003 and ICC-2011, claim to achieve a narrow selection of patients with ME conforming to a hypothesised specific pathophysiology. Our review demonstrates, however, that these case definitions do not necessarily exclude patients with psychopathology.
Brurberg et al. said:According to our review, it is uncertain whether a more homogenous subset of patients can be achieved with the Canada-2003 and ICC-2011 case definitions. The authors of the latter paper write: “Collectively, members have approximately 400 years of both clinical and teaching experience, authored hundreds of peer-reviewed publications, diagnosed or treated approximately 50 000 patients with ME and several members coauthored previous criteria.”23 This declaration is no validity criterion and provides no guarantee that the case definition works according to the intentions.
Brurberg et al. said:A lesson could be learnt from Reeves, who tried to elaborate the CDC1994/Fukuda definition and bring methodological rigour into the diagnostic criteria by scores from standardised and validated instruments.63 The Empirical-2006/Reeves case definition led to a tenfold prevalence estimate as compared with the CDC1994/Fukuda definition,64 probably due to misclassification and inclusion of patients with major depressive disorder.65 The purpose of rigour had not been achieved, and the Empirical-2006/Reeves case definition was never broadly implemented.
Brurberg et al. said:
@biophile Thanks for the post. I also saw some more useful aspects within this paper. I also wondered if you had considered the relevancy here to what the IOM and P2P are planning to do with their own assessments of clinical and research definitions, and attempts to recommend new ones. Nobody else seems to have considered that a similar exercise to this paper might be completed by either of those committees - or that this paper itself could form part of their evidence. One of the things I took from this paper was the I think fair critique at the lack of empirical evidence to better substantiate any definition and properly compare different ones: however neither of the committees are planning empirical testing as far as I am aware - which seems (as has been said before) something of an oversight to say the least, if any new definition is to be taken seriously.
Actually, I think it's the main the basis for the opposition to the IOM process. We all know that if an evidence review of the literature is carried out, then it is likely to end up making the same sort of recommendations as this review paper*, because relatively little research has been carried out using the CCC or ICC. (This review paper rightly says that most research uses Oxford and Fukuda.)I also wondered if you had considered the relevancy here to what the IOM and P2P are planning to do with their own assessments of clinical and research definitions, and attempts to recommend new ones. Nobody else seems to have considered that a similar exercise to this paper might be completed by either of those committees - or that this paper itself could form part of their evidence.
(They are referring to Oxford and Fukuda.)Brurberg et al. said:Research requires uniform and reproducible criteria, suitable for unambiguous definitions of the target population. Another concern is to compare studies across time and nations. These are arguments for an inclusive case definition, preferably one which has been in use for a while, and for which validation studies are available.
However, the authors assert that Fukuda and Oxford are preferable to the CCC.Brurberg et al. said:On the basis of our review, we argue that development of further case definitions of CFS/ME should be given low priority...
It reviewed research related to both clinical and research practice, but the discussion seems to be devoted solely to clinical practice.Did the paper allow for the use of separate clinical and research definitions or the use of combined definitions in research? I wonder if there was any thoughts expressed as to the need for separate definitions in clinical diagnosis and research?
Nacul et al[50] used general practitioner (GP) databases and questionnaires and identified 278 patients with unexplained chronic fatigue (CF) conforming to one or more of the case definition applied, that is, CDC-1994/Fukuda et al,[39] Canadian-2003[22] or ECD-2008.[34] [...] Only one study held a level of rigour where independent application of several case definitions was conducted on the same population (model A).[50] Such a study should ideally be based on a population sample rather than a GP practice database, and should compare a selection of currently applied and debated case definitions, such as CDC-1994/Fukuda, Oxford-1991, Canadian-2003 and NICE-2007.
When you read about the ME outbreaks, there was obvious similarities but some degree of heterogeneity. ME was an acute condition, from which many people seemed to recover from. Once chronic it seemed to remain chronic for many. The Incline Village outbreak sounds like another ME epidemic. "CFS" was a botched loose construction in a botched response to the Incline Village outbreak. Then a whole bunch of psychobabble was imported into the concept of CFS from pre-existing concepts used in psychiatry and it became a wastebasket fatigue diagnosis and a poster-child of broadly-define psychosomatic functional illness which drowned out ME. ME and CFS became smeared together.
Different patients may have arrived at a CFS diagnosis from multiple points of origin, but it does not necessarily mean they are generally at the same end-state or have the same pathophysiology. CFS still functions as a waste-basket diagnosis. Until the end-state(s) is better elucidated, how do we know we are all generally at the same end-state?
Lots of patients in the broad approach do not even report cardinal symptoms associated with ME. And as I mentioned on another thread, reporting similar symptoms is not a guarantee of sharing the same explicit symptoms.