Angela Kennedy
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But what Sharpe and others are arguing is that with the development of neuropsychiatry as a discipline largely replacing the classic conceptual divisions of 'brain illness' and 'mental illness', then the formerly used classification differentials may no longer apply.
They may be arguing this, but this doesn't make their argument plausible. They are claiming that the brain in synonymous with an abstract concept of the mind (or of the act of thinking). This belief is untenable for many reasons that people have been trying to address for many centuries.
That Sharpe is using the argument for self serving purposes isn't an effective counter argument, and while it is true there's a turf war between the neurochemists and the neuropsychiatrists based around the chicken and egg percept of whether mental illness precipitates abnormal brain chemistry, or whether it's chemistry that precipitates illness, that does not provide an adequate rebuttal to Sharpe's (implied) 'conflationist' argument that 'fatigue conditions' are both mental and neurological.
Who here has made that argument? I haven't certainly . I'm arguing his presumptions (and yours) are incorrect, not self-serving.
A purist postion on classification is no longer feasible - even on this forum we have people arguing for both various and multiple disease causations, there may be pragmatic reasons to seek specific classifications with ICD -11 and the US opt out version but the key thing for long term progress is to require research $//Es going toward aetiology irrespective of where M.E/CFS sits in any classification system or which particular medical discipline wants to claim 'possession'.
The 'chicken or egg' argument is itself specious. There are known neurological conditions that affect behaviour, perception, responses. These tend to have been discovered through the laborious process of science. Beliefs in psychogenic illness, on the other hand are much less safe, both because of the lack of verifiable scientific evidence, and the tendency towards ad hoc literary, even quasi religious theory present in much psychiatric and psycho-analytical discourse. Psychogenic explanations currently are founded on various logical fallacies that Sharpe exhibits even in the examples on this thread: "A causes B therefore B must cause A"; "I don't know what physical mechanism is disordered therefore it must be metaphysical";
The old fallacy of the third way ("It's a little bit of this and a little bit of that", "I've moved beyond dualism. Aren't I clever?"); "I can't decide if you're a faker, a hypochondriac, or your ability to think controls your body in ever increasing ways, therefore I'm going with an eclectic mixture of all three"; "Let's invoke the god of the gaps by the act of balck-boxing"- and so forth.
Your use of the word 'purist' is wrong. By your argument, diabetes should be classified as psychological as well. In fact, current attempts are to make everything 'a little bit psychological' in the new DSM (hence the somatic symptoms disorder categorisations). And that is all based on the fallacy of psychogenic diagnosis by default in areas of uncertainty in medical knowledge.
The argument against so-called 'purism' is actually an argument against clarity and logic (I'd also say scientific method).
I note you have not addressed the fact the psychs are so desperate to classify ME/CFS in F48.