Act today, while there's still time (DSM-5) + new response
From Suzy Chapman for
http://dxrevisionwatch.wordpress.com
15 July 2011
Final day for submitting DSM-5 feedback
If you haven't already submitted a letter, this year, and if you are up to it, I urge you to register and submit feedback, today. The closing date has been extended by the APA to today, July 15.
I am still collating submissions to DSM-5 on my website. If you have already submitted and would like a copy of your letter included on my site, please forward a copy to
me.agenda@virgin.net stating how you would like to be styled. No email addresses will be published or made available to others.
Thanks to all those organizations and individuals who have already submitted or raised awareness:
Copies of this years submissions, including the Coalition4ME's "Call to Action" resources and template letter, are being collated here:
http://wp.me/PKrrB-19a
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One of the latest submissions:
Submission from US patient 1
For the attention of the DSM-5 Task Force and particularly to the members of the Somatic Symptom Disorder Work Group:
I have reviewed the draft for the proposed category of
Somatic Symptom Disorders, and in particular Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder (CSSD), and find major flaws in their diagnostic philosophy and criteria that would easily lead to the misdiagnosis of, or unwarranted add-on psychological diagnoses for, any number of physical diseases or conditions with no psychosomatic component, but which lack clear biomarkers, sufficiently diagnostic tests, or are comprised of medically unexplained symptoms. I strongly recommend that the clinical viability of the SSD category be re-examined and that the CSSD category be abandoned altogether.
There is a fundamental flaw in the way 'somatic symptoms disorders' are described in the latest draft:
"This group of disorders is characterized predominantly by somatic symptoms or concerns that are associated with significant distress and/or dysfunction...Such symptoms may be initiated, exacerbated or maintained by combinations of biological, psychological and social factors."
This is unacceptably broad characterization. How many diseases exist in medicine that would not in some way fit this description? Virtually all immunologically-based diseases, and most pathogen-associated ones, could hypothetically be impacted by biological, psychosocial, and social factors. Yet initiation, exacerbation and maintenance can represent completely distinct etiologies, and "combinations" of biological and psychological or social factors could include, again, almost every disease in existence, including those for which there is not hard evidence (or evidence at all) to suggest that psychological intervention makes a significant impact or indeed that there is a 'psychological component' to the disease that can be isolated at all.
That brings up the essential problem with the entire concept of somatic symptoms disorders - they are based on an amalgam of clinical observations and scant psychological studies that are overwhelmingly poorly powered. Psychology in general (and psychosomatic study in particular) is an inherently difficult field in which to employ an empirical scientific approach, so it is largely inappropriate to treat the concepts that emerge from psychology on an empirically equivalent footing with the more rigorously positivist data that supports biomedical findings. The two are often philosophically incompatible; the concept of somatic symptom disorders is highly metaphorical, and its broad application in clinical medical practice can only lead to confusion and misdiagnosis. This is especially true in its application to diseases that are poorly understood. The precise etiology of these illnesses is still hotly debated; many clinicians and biomedical researchers who specialize in them are in total disagreement with psychosomatic specialists who speculate upon a role for psychiatric components based on studies within their own field. Therefore, until these poorly understood illnesses have been more thoroughly researched, it is wholly unscientific to assume a role for psychiatric factors in disease causation, initiation, or persistence. To do otherwise would be to inappropriately create a psychiatric diagnosis for many patients who may not require one, which carries with it the potential for iatrogenic harm and social stigma.
Is there any medical evidence that the condition(s) defined by these criteria actually exists? Has it been accepted by clinicians who treat, for instance, diabetes? Has the DSM-5 working group consulted physician's organizations about the concept of adding such psychiatric diagnoses to essentially any medical condition? Has the impact this will have on healthcare delivery and insurance reimbursement truly been taken into consideration during such consultations? I suspect not, yet these are vital subjects.
The proposed categories and guidelines will create a scenario where a clinician will have too much power to determine whether a patient's response to their bodily symptoms and concerns about their health are
"excessive", or their perception of their level of disability
"disproportionate". It will create a tendency towards violation of the precept of "do no harm" by compromising the centrality of patient input and the equality of the doctor-patient relationship. It will compromise the ability of clinicians to continue to reassess a case over time through empirical observations by encouraging an a priori framework and subjective bias in the clinicians' minds. The effect for patient care could be disastrous, as legitimate and significant complaints could far more easily be ignored; further, insurance reimbursement for biomedical tests and treatments is certain to suffer when a psychological diagnosis is added to the physical one.
A clear example involves the proposed CSSD category and its potential effect on patients with myalgic encephalomyelitis (ME), or chronic fatigue syndrome (CFS) - hereafter referred to jointly as ME/CFS. As defined, a CSSD diagnosis could be inappropriately applied to patients with ME/CFS - a disease for which a solely physical pathology has been firmly established. Too many ME/CFS patients would easily fall into the sinkhole of the excessively indeterminate and highly subjective diagnostic criteria for CSSD.
As stated in the draft, CSSD diagnosis requires that criteria labeled A, B and C be met; the first and last are obviously met by ME/CFS as well as any other chronic physical disease. The second is outlined as follows:
"B. Excessive thoughts, feelings, and behaviors related to these somatic symptoms or associated health concerns: At least two of the following are required to meet this criterion:
(1) High level of health-related anxiety.
(2) Disproportionate and persistent concerns about the medical seriousness of one's symptoms.
(3) Excessive time and energy devoted to these symptoms or health concerns."
The determination of points 1-3 is far too subjective for this to be the only criterion standing between a patient with a poorly defined physical disease and a misdiagnosis of mental illness. Whereas such a criterion should be highly discriminative between physical and psychological elements, criterion B focuses upon psychological assessments of highly questionable empiric strength and clinical value. As it is incapable of distinguishing many physical symptoms and distress from psychological ones, it would heavily overdiagnose psychopathology. The preconceptions and limitations of the practitioner become far too important here, as do highly subjective judgements; to let these elements potentially intrude into the realm of physical disease diagnosis is a grave error. Let us consider each of the subcriteria 1-3 in turn, with relevance to ME/CFS:
(1) -
Anxiousness or anxiety is a ubiquitous and extremely frequently diagnosed symptom. The health concerns of the majority of ME/CFS patients are similar to those of HIV positive patients; however, absent the same diagnostic clarity and the same degree of biomedical knowledge about the disease process, the concerns of ME/CFS patients are all too easily dismissed as excessive, i.e. anxiety, by clinicians who know little or nothing about ME/CFS. It should also be noted that the experience of having any medically inexplicable and likely untreatable disease itself can engender a high level of anxiety, yet that fact is not taken into consideration in this criterion. Thus in both ME/CFS and other conditions that are less understood, it is exceedingly easy for a clinician to inappropriately apply subcriterion 2.
(2) - The assumption that every clinician is suitably educated about every physical disease is obviously the Achilles' heel of this and the other subcriteria. Although ME/CFS is a serious physical disease that affects a rough estimate of a million people in the United States alone, it sadly is misunderstood and/or not taken seriously by the majority of clinicians, who know little or nothing about it. (The situation is actually similar for many other conditions for which a physical cause is never even questioned, such as adult mitochondrial diseases and various dysautonomias.) How can a clinician who knows little or nothing about a disease determine the medical seriousness of a patient's symptoms, and therefore whether a patient's response is disproportionate? And if the disease is chronic in nature, would it not be normal for a patient to express 'persistent' concern about it?
Part of the problem arises when a clinician considers certain bodily symptoms to be normal' regardless of context. It should be clear that a symptom is not something that can be standardized, yet members of the DSM-5 working group have previously stated that orthostatic dizziness is a normal bodily sensation. This is a dubious statement indeed; it is not normal to experience this symptom chronically or severely. Various forms of orthostatic intolerance are very common in ME/CFS, causing persistent or recurring dizziness that is certainly not normal and should be treated if possible.
Another issue is that a practitioner who is simply unaware of some of the hallmarks of ME/CFS will all too easily mischaracterize genuine patient concerns as excessive. As just one example, if the practitioner is unaware of the phenomenon of post-exertional decline, s/he will easily mistake an ME/CFS patients concerns about relapse, etc from overexertion for catastrophizing.
Thus, subcriterion 2 could be wrongly attributed to an ME/CFS patient by any practitioner lacking in knowledge or understanding of the disease and of research on the disease. Given the extremely poor state of medical education about ME/CFS, the likelihood of inappropriate labeling is great - a point that cannot be overstated.
(3) - Any disabling or distressing physical symptoms of sufficient intensity can dominate a patients life; thus subcriterion 3 is so lacking in clinical rigor and definition that it could be applied incorrectly to those with almost any disease with no psychopathology, but especially to ME/CFS patients due to the relative ignorance of a majority of clinicians about the disease.
Thus, false identification of criterion B in ME/CFS (and other diseases) can occur too easily and in too many ways for it to have any real diagnostic value. As criteria A and C are also met by default in ME/CFS, that means the CSSD criteria as a whole will in clinical practice almost certainly result in the misdiagnoses and the erroneous labeling of many ME/CFS patients with CSSD.
In this context, it should be remembered that the repercussions of having an erroneous psychosomatic label of any kind on a patients medical record, especially if s/he has a controversial disease like ME/CFS, can have a terrible impact on the patients physical, emotional, and economic well-being; treatment by medical professionals, insurance claims and government benefits for physical disability can all be denied, and one can easily imagine the subsequent consequences.
The case of ME/CFS provides just one obvious example of how major flaws in the criteria for Complex Somatic Symptom Disorder (CSSD) would easily lead to the misdiagnosis of, or inappropriate additional psychological diagnosis for, patients with a poorly understood physical disease that lacks a significant psychological component. As such misdiagnoses or add-on diagnoses could lead to extreme iatrogenic harm, I cannot overstate to the DSM-5 Task Force the importance of removing the category of CSSD.
Additionally, I hope that the Task Force will revisit the conceptual framework of Somatic Symptom Disorders themselves.
I thank you for your time and consideration.
US patient 1
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Resources
The two key PDF documents "Disorders Descriptions" and "Rationale", which expand on the Work Group's proposals are here:
http://tinyurl.com/SSD-Disorders-Description
http://tinyurl.com/SSD-Justification-of-Criteria
Register to submit feedback via the DSM-5 Development website here: http://tinyurl.com/Somatic-Symptom-Disorders
Once registered and logged in, leave comment on CSSD criteria here: http://tinyurl.com/DSM-5-CSSD
Suzy Chapman
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me.agenda@virgin.net
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