Simon
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I found this a really helpful explanation about the central Bayesian idea of prior probablilities, illustrated by a drunk, and a musician.
Comwell's rule in Bayesian statistics
That's it. Did it for me, hope it helps someone.
Actually, that's not even the main point of the article (Oliver Cromwell comes into it)
Full blog
Comwell's rule in Bayesian statistics
I've probably already quoted more than is fair, but the basic idea is that according to normal statistical approaches, we should have as much confidence in the drunk as the musician. But with Bayesian statistics, you would probably (ha) start off the with prior confidence (probablility) that the musician was much more likely to be right than the drunk. After the experiment the claims of both would have more credibility, but the musician would still be rated as more likely to be right than the drunk.Jim Berger gives the following example illustrating the difference between frequentist and Bayesian approaches to inference in his book The Likelihood Principle.
Experiment 1:
A fine musician, specializing in classical works, tells us that he is able to distinguish if Hayden or Mozart composed some classical song. Small excerpts of the compositions of both authors are selected at random and the experiment consists of playing them for identification by the musician. The musician makes 10 correct guesses in exactly 10 trials.
Experiment 2:
A drunken man says he can correctly guess in a coin toss what face of the coin will fall down. Again, after 10 trials the man correctly guesses the outcomes of the 10 throws.
That's it. Did it for me, hope it helps someone.
Actually, that's not even the main point of the article (Oliver Cromwell comes into it)
Full blog