I wonder whether Moore's paradox might partially explain the enthusiasm of others to ascribe to us false illness beliefs and our certainty that they are wrong to do so. I post this with caution as I am not a linguistic or analytical philosopher, merely someone with an interest in words and their uses and implications. I suspect that there may be people here with a better grounding in the subject and I would welcome their input. G E Moore was a Cambridge philosopher and his paradox was seized upon and utilised by Wittgenstein. You may say "it is raining". You may say "I do not believe it is raining". You may say "it is raining but he does not believe it". You may say "it was raining but I did not believe it". But you may not say "it is raining but I do not believe it". Try it if you don't believe me. This is Moore's paradox. It seems that one cannot assert the fact and simultaneously express a contrary belief-at least , not without lying about one part of the proposition. To assert the fact and express the contrary opinion requires the crossing of some linguistic and psychological boundary. It is apparently an illegal move in the language game. At some level, in some circumstances, assertion and belief are inextricably linked. We are familiar with the language of illness which we have been learning since childhood. We recognise the sensations, external indications and the loss of function or capacity which in normal parlance together constitute illness. On this basis we assert that we are ill. We can be certain of it. We do not have an illness belief, we have an illness. It is not open to us to say either "I am ill but I believe that I am not ill" or the converse "I am not ill but I believe that I am ill". Both statements appear to be nonsense. The latter statement seems to be what the charlatans try to persuade us to say, with a view to rectifying our beliefs. But until such time as all the signs and symptoms are removed we have no choice but to continue to assert, in accordance with our experience, that we are ill-and any belief must accord with the assertion. The problem is that these constraints and linkages do not apply to third parties. Just as you may say "it is raining but he does not believe it" you may say "he is not ill but he believes himself to be ill". In such circumstances one might reasonably call for evidence to a reasonable standard, in so far as evidence can be adduced to prove a negative, but there is no inherent contradiction in the statements. It may simply be that we are unable to have meaningful discourse on this matter with those who adopt the contrary position unless both sides recognise the problem (or puzzle as Wittgenstein would probably have preferred it to be called). On the other hand I may be wrong. For my part I find myself unable to imagine what a false illness belief could be. I see that it could be meaningful in the sense:A believed himself to have illness X whereas he was later discovered to have illness Y. In the intervening period he had a false illness belief. But the false belief only applied to the name of the illness. The symptoms would continue whatever the name ascribed to them. I suspect that the psychiatrists use a meaning such as this but seek to use it in some other inappropriate context in such a way as to render the concept devoid of meaning. I have not seen these questions discussed elsewhere but I do not always pay attention.