5. Illness "Due to the Thinking of the Patient"
The body of Aylward’s research and theoretical enquiry, ostensibly via the BPS model, has a peculiarly
singular slant considering the diverse nature of that perspective; that is a relentless emphasis on an
individual’s ‘beliefs’ and ‘attitudes’ towards their illness (Barnes et al, 2008). In this sense it could more
aptly be termed the ‘Psycho’ model of illness, with contributors drawn almost exclusively from within
that discipline. Publications exemplifying this bias are too numerous to mention, dominating as it does
the lobby’s discourse, but include Aylward’s co-authored book ‘The Power of Belief’ dedicated to
addressing the purported “epidemic of common health problems” that is said to be ‘beleaguering’ British
society.
A feature of the lobby’s literature in general is the framing of this ‘problem’ in ‘mysterious’ terms, as a
‘paradox’, something unexplainable against a context of the alleged ‘improvement’ in general health of
the nation. This assumption it will later be shown, based as it is on a generalisation of data, obscures the
uneven distribution of these health benefits across a society stratified by occupation.
A double standard is observable within the BPS lobby’s argument against the legitimacy of ‘symptom-
defined illnesses’ (such as IBS, stress and back conditions). The medical establishment is asserted to
have allowed the growth of ‘syndromes’, which they construct as having less validity than ‘diseases’,
counterpoised as having a solid pathological basis.
It is strongly ironic, then, that they do not hold psychology to the same criticism, since its epistemology
is practically founded on the creation of labels around sets of observed behaviours. Aylward and
LoCascio treat us to a round-up of some of the terms that have proliferated in psychology around
‘medically unexplained symptoms’: “hypochondriasis”, “hysteria”, “functional overlay”, “somatisation”,
“malingering”, “illness behaviour” etc” (Aylward and LoCascio, 1995,p.19) that they state has been to
‘confusing’ effect.
Though some might consider this inconsistency to be evidence of a flaw in that general theory, the
authors’ motive in recounting this seems to be more in order to establish that there is something there to
‘psychologise’.
